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A REVIEW OF THE ississIPPi BROWNFIELDS
VOLUNTARY CLEANUP AND REDEVELOPMENT ACT
Christopher G. Wells*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1998 legislative session, the Mississippi legislature passed S.B. No.
2989, the Mississippi Brownfields Voluntary Cleanup and Redevelopment Act
("Act").1 The Act established a program to encourage the cleanup and redevelop-
ment of contaminated property by providing protection from liability for contam-
ination cleanup under state law and by lowering the potential cost of redevelop-
ment through more lenient remediation levels than would otherwise be required
under other state and federal environmental laws.
The purpose of this Comment is to give the background against which the legis-
lature passed the Act and to suggest some possible improvements to the program.
Part II of this Comment defines the brownfields problem and its origin. Part III is
a review of various federal and state responses to the brownfields problem. This
review provides a means of comparison and contrast of those efforts and Missis-
sippi's initiative. Part IV gives an overview of the Act. Part V explores possible
improvements to the Act.
The conclusion drawn from the analysis of the Act is that it represents merely
an initial step toward revitalization of contaminated sites in Mississippi. The Act
could, however, potentially have a significant effect on the health and environ-
ment of Mississippians. In addition, by putting those contaminated sites back
into use, the program could greatly improve the state's economy.
II. THE BROWNFIELDS PROBLEM
Brownfields are "abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial
facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived
environmental contamination."2 The number of brownfield sites in the United
States is estimated to be as high as 450,000?. Brownfields tend to be properties in
low-income neighborhoods where unemployment is high. The fact that these
sites are not developed generally means that unemployment remains high, which
causes local tax revenues to be too low for local governments to afford to clean up
the sites.' These contaminated sites also pose health risks to the local residents.'
The main reason these sites exist is the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), as amended by the
*I thank my mother, Betty, my father, Ken, my wife, Catherine, and the rest of my family for their love, support,
and encouragement throughout this and my many other endeavors.
1. Codified at MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-35-1 to -27 (Supp. 1998).
2. CHRISTIAN VOLZ & PETER L. GRAY, 1998 WILEY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW UPDATE 244 (1998) (citing OFFICE
OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PuB. No.
9230.0-30, THE BROWNFIELDS ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE; APPLICATION GUIDELINES FOR
DEMONSTRATION PILOTS 1 (1995)).
3. Christopher Williams, Brownfields-Redevelopment Effort Grows, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1995, at A9.
4. VOLZ & GRAY, supra note 2, at 245.
5. Id.
6. Eric D. Madden, The Voluntary Cleanup and Property Redevelopment Act - The Limits of the Kansas
Brownfields Law, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 593, 595-96 (1998).
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Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,' or state law equiva-
lents of CERCLA.' CERCLA imposes strict liability for the release of hazardous
substances on owners and operators of contaminated facilities or property, trans-
porters of hazardous substances, and on those who arrange for the disposal of
hazardous substances.' The owner/operator liability is not limited to past owners,
who may have actually caused the release, but includes present owners or opera-
tors of a facility as well.1" Most courts also hold that liability is joint and several
for all Potentially Responsible Parties ("PRP")." The only way a PRP may avoid
joint and several liability is to prove that the harm it caused is divisible from the
harm caused by other PRPs 2 Another harsh aspect of CERCLA liability is that
most courts have not required proof of causation under CERCLA 3
In addition to strict, joint and several liability and no requirement of causation,
lenders have, in the past, been held liable for CERCLA violations, 4 although
Congress acted to protect lenders from liability as "owners or operators" under
CERCLA in 1996 with the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and Deposit
Insurance Act." These harsh effects of CERCLA have combined to prevent the
development of brownfields because potential developers and financers fear lia-
bility for any contamination present on a site.
III. SOME SOLUTIONS TO THE BROWNFIELDS PROBLEM
As has happened with other radical environmental laws, such as the Clean Air
Act,"6 the initial euphoria over the potential environmental benefits of CERCLA
has begun to wear off. People have begun to realize that CERCLA was perhaps
too ambitious-an overreaction. Such feelings have caused a reevaluation of
CERCLA and a movement, especially at the state level, toward moderating the
effects of CERCLA.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
8. See, e.g., 415 ILL. CoMIp. STAT, ANN. 5/22.2 (West Supp. 1998); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 1-18 (Law.
Co-op 1996 & Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. § 1 15B (1997 & Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-310 to 310.24
(1997); N.H. RE. STAT. ANN. §§ 147-B:1- :15 (1996 & Supp. 1997).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
10. Id. at § 9607(a)(1).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 267-71 (3d Cir. 1992); O'Neil v. Picillo,
883 E2d 176, 178 (lst Cir. 1989); United States v. R.W Meyer, Inc., 889 E2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1042 n.13 (2d Cir. 1985).
12. See In re Bell Petroleum Serv., Inc., 3 E3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F Supp. 802, 811 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
13. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 E2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Farmland Indus. v.
Colorado Eastern R.R. Co., 922 E Supp. 437 (D. Colo. 1996); Premium Plastics v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 904 F
Supp. 809 (N.D. I11. 1995); Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Research Corp., 847 F. Supp. 389
(E.D. Va. 1994). Two commentators have opined, however, that the United States Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876 (June 8, 1998), which applied the traditional common law rules of
parent corporation liability for the actions of a subsidiary, may lead the way to application of similar common
law rules respecting tort liability, such as causation, in CERCLA cases. Robert S. Sanoff & Jeffrey L. Roelofs,
'Bestfoods '- A Return to Common Sense, 13 Toxics LAW REPORTER 127 (1998).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 E2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990).
15. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, §§ 2501-05 (1996).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (1994).
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A. Attempts by Congress and the EPA to Address the Brownfields Problem
Congress has, to some degree, addressed the backlash toward CERLA by pass-
ing the Brownfields Tax Incentive in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.17 If a par-
ticular brownfields site is in an area that meets certain use, contamination, and
geographic or demographic criteria, environmental cleanup costs associated with
the site are tax deductible in the year they are incurred."8 Despite this step by
Congress, however, CERCLA remains a major hurdle to the development and
restoration of contaminated properties.
Indeed, major statutory reform is required for a complete solution to the
brownfields dilemma. However, Congress has failed to pass bills in recent years
that would have amended CERCLA to address various concerns including
brownfields 9 In fact, one such proposed bill would have established a federal
brownfields program."
The EPA has reacted to the backlash against environmental legislation by
implementing various administrative reforms aimed at encouraging the develop-
ment of brownfields. Those measures include: (1) decreasing the number of haz-
ardous substance release sites listed on the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Information System ("CERCLIS"),
which many developers may view as an EPA "most wanted" list and, therefore,
avoid the listed sites; (2) changing the procedure for taking sites off of the
National Priorities List (NPL) to allow portions of sites to be taken off the list
before complete remediation of the site; (3) establishing a pilot project grant pro-
gram; (4) entering into "Prospective Purchaser Agreements"2 and issuing "guid-
ances" and policy statements providing for covenants not to sue or to bring
enforcement actions against those involved in cleaning up contaminated sites;
and (5) issuing a guidance that encourages the consideration of prospective
industrial or other land use as a factor in determining the level to which a site
must be remediated, instead of requiring the site be remediated to a level suited
for residential use.22
The guidances are especially significant in conjunction with the state brown-
fields programs. They afford prospective developers some protection from CER-
CLA, which otherwise still exists, despite participation in a state brownfields
program. This is particularly true of the guidances on "Prospective Purchaser
Agreements," which may include covenants not to sue.23
17. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, 882 (1997).
18. Id. at 883-84.
19. See, e.g., S. 1285, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2500, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1497, 105th Cong. (1997).
20. H.R. 3020, 105th Cong. (1997).
21. Superfund Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed.
Reg. 34,235 (1989). That policy provides for releases from liability under CERCLA and covenants not to sue
purchasers of contaminated properties who commit to specific cleanups. See Joel B. Eisen, 'Brownfields of
dreams'?: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 883, 982
(1996).
22. See generally VOLZ & GRAY, supra note 2, at 257-58.
23. See Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements with Prospective Purchasers of
Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792 (1995); Superfund
Program; De Minimis Landowner Settlements, Prospective Purchaser Settlements, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235 (1989);
see also VOLZ & GRLAY, supra note 2, at 258 and Eisen, supra note 21, at 982.
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In 1997, the EPA proposed a guidance for developing Memoranda of
Agreement, which would have essentially allowed delegation of CERCLA
enforcement to the states. The Final Draft Guidance was withdrawn, however,
due to unfavorable comments.24 Although this does not appear to prohibit or
preclude a Memorandum of Agreement between the EPA and a state environ-
mental agency, the lack of guidance may effectively guarantee that the EPA will
not enter into any new agreements. This is unfortunate for prospective develop-
ers because if state law or state enforcement of CERCLA were the only threats,
liability protection under a state brownfields program would be significantly
increased.25
B. State Brownfields Redevelopment Programs
State CERCLA-equivalent statutes26 pose another substantial barrier to rede-
velopment of brownfields. The state statutes generally apply to smaller or less
contaminated sites than those with which the EPA is concerned." Although the
state statutes do not preclude the application of CERCLA, a state brownfields
program that protects a prospective developer from liability under state law can
be a significant incentive for redevelopment of a site.
The states that have passed brownfields legislation vary in their approaches to
solving the brownfields problem. Some provide liability protection, while others
provide flexible cleanup criteria or economic incentives. 8 However, there are
some common aspects. Most state programs are voluntary,29 and they generally
allow for revocation of the benefits, or "re-opening" of a brownfields redevelop-
ment plan, when the participating party provides false information or otherwise
abuses the program." This section of the Comment is a review of some of the
existing state voluntary cleanup programs. The reader may use this review to
compare the incentives offered under those programs with the incentives offered
under the Mississippi Brownfields Voluntary Cleanup and Redevelopment Act.31
The focus of this review is mainly upon the programs of some Southeastern
24. Notice of Availability of Final Draft Guidance for Developing Superfund Memoranda of Agreement
(MOA) Language Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,495 (1997); see 1997: The
Year in Review (1998) A.B.A. SEC. NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 263.
25. See infra Part III.B. See also Notice of Availability of Final Draft Guidance for Developing Superfund
Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) Language Concerning State Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 62 Fed. Reg.
47,495 (1997).
26. See supra note 8; see also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY PuB. No. 96-963249, AN ANALYSIS OF
STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY (1995).
27. See VoLz & GRAY, supra note 2, at 246.
28. Id. at 248
29. Id. at 248; see also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 26.
30. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.33(c) (1997); FLA. STAT. ch. 376.82(3) (Supp. 1998).
31. See infra Part IV
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states and some representative programs from other parts of the nation, although
there are many other such programs across the country. 2
1. Tennessee
Several of Mississippi's neighbors have established brownfields cleanup pro-
grams. Tennessee is one of the states that has led the way in the brownfields ini-
tiative. Tennessee was one of the first states to enter into a Prospective-
Purchaser Agreement,3" which allowed the continued industrial use of a severely
contaminated site called Copper Hill, while requiring a gradual cleanup of the
site. 4
Tennessee's brownfields program is a combination of the Voluntary Cleanup
Oversight and Assistance Program ("VOAP"), 3s an amendment to its state
Superfund statutes 3 and two provisions of the state Superfund statutes that differ
from their federal inspiration-apportioned liability 37 and lender-liability protec-
tion.38 Under the VOAP, a prospective developer must: (1) pay a $5,000 fee for
participating in the program; 39 (2) conduct an investigation of the contamination
on the site; 40 and (3) enter into a consent order with the state environmental pro-
tection agency and complete the prescribed cleanup.41 Upon completion of the
cleanup, the agency issues a "no further action" letter, "if appropriate. 42
The major liability protection provided by the Tennessee program is the appor-
tioned liability under the state Superfund statutes. Instead of imposing joint and
several liability, the program apportions liability based on a list of equitable con-
siderations.43 The other major protection from liability applies to lenders who
merely maintain indicia of ownership for purposes of protecting their investment,
32. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 25-16-301 to -310 (1995); 415 ILL. COMP STAT. 5/22.2 (West 1997); IND. CODE
§ 13-25-5 (1997); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.01-450 to -465 (Michie Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38,
§ 343-E (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., ENvIR. §§ 3-901 to -905 (Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. § 115B.17 (1995);
Mo. RE. STAT. §§ 260.565-75 and 447.700-716 (1996); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-15, 181-188 (1994 & Supp.
1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-310.30-.40 (1997); RI. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-19.14-1 to -14 (1996); TEX. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.601-.613 (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-6-301 to -325 (1995 &
Supp. 1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6615(a) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1429.1 to 10.1-1429.3 (Michie
1997); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.105D.010 and 70.105D.090 (West Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE §§ 22-22-1
to -17 (1996); Wis. STAT. §§ 292.11-.21 (1995). Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts,
and New Jersey have programs that are not consolidated into a single statutory provision. The brownfields pro-
grams in those states are a result of the interaction of various statutory provisions. For a discussion of these
programs, see TODD S. DAVIs & KEvIN D. MARGOLIS, BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 287-96; 313-32; 357-69; 374-81; 443-56; 518-27 (1997), respectively. States, such as
New Jersey and New York, do not have statutory programs, but the environmental protection agencies of both
states have administrative programs to encourage redevelopment. See id. at 518-38.
33. DAviS AND MARGOLIS, supra note 32, at 592.
34. Id.
35. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-224 (1996).
36. Id. §§ 68-212-201 to -223.
37. Id. § 68-212-207.
38. Id. §§ 68-212-202(E)(ii), 68-212-401 to -407.
39. Id. § 68-212-224(b).
40. Id. § 68-212-224(a).
41. Id.; see generally DAvis AND MARGOLIS, supra note 32, at 593-94.
42. TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-224(g).
43. Id. § 68-212-207(b)(1).
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but who do not participate in the operation of the site." Finally, the Tennessee
program bases cleanup standards, or requirements, on risk-based criteria and
remedy selection, based on factors, including cost-effectiveness of technology
alternatives and the nature of the danger to human health and the environment
posed by the contamination. '
2. Florida
In 1997, the Florida legislature passed the Brownfields Redevelopment Act.46
The program is available to private parties or municipalities.47 Any person not
responsible for contributing to the contamination is eligible for the program.'
Once a municipality notifies the state environmental agency of its intention to
designate a site for brownfield cleanup, the municipality or a private party may
negotiate a brownfields site rehabilitation agreement with the agency. 49 The
agreement must contain rehabilitation requirements, including risk-based clean-
up criteria to be established by regulation by July 1, 1998, as well as certain
assurances from the party performing the rehabilitation. "
The Florida program provides liability protection from state law, including pro-
tection from third parties for recovery of remediation costs."1 The liability pro-
tection extends to lenders. 2 The program also provides economic incentives,
including tax exemptions and credits, minority enterprise programs, community
development block grants, and low- or zero-interest loans for cleanup costs.
5 3
Finally, the program provides regulatory incentives, including waiver of fees,
zoning incentives, and stream-lined permitting procedures.5 4
3. Arkansas
Arkansas's first attempt at a brownfields program was an amendment to the
Remedial Action Trust Fund Act.55 That program was a failure from the begin-
ning because it provided no practical protection from liability, or any other realis-
tic incentives to redevelopment of brownfields. Subsequently, the Arkansas leg-
islature repealed that statute and established a new program. 6 Any person desir-
ing to "acquire an abandoned site and [who] is not responsible for any pre-exist-
44. Id. §§ 68-212-401 to -407.
45. Id. § 68-212-206; see DAVIS AND MARGOLIS, supra note 32, at 596-97 (citing TENN. CoMP. R. & REGS. tit.
1200, ch. 13 (1996)).
46. FLA. STAT. ch. 376.77-376.83 (Supp. 1998).
47. Id. ch. 376.80.
48. Id. ch. 376.82(1).
49. Id. ch. 376.80.
50. Id. ch. 376.80, 376.81(1).
51. Id. ch. 376.82.
52. Id.
53. Id. ch. 376.84.
54. Id.
55. Id. § 8-7-523.
56. Id. §§ 8-7-1101 to -1104 (Michie Supp. 1997).
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ing pollution at or contamination on the site" is eligible to participate in the pro-
gram. 7 The goal of the program is to put abandoned properties back into pro-
ductive use and create employment opportunities.56
Under the new program, the state environmental protection agency may enter
into a consent administrative order with a prospective purchaser. 9 The order
delineates all "liabilities and obligations" associated with the brownfields site."0
The agreement must include remediation requirements based on consideration of
the risk to humans and the environment,61 as well as future land use limitations
and engineering controls intended to be used on the site.62 An interesting aspect
of the Arkansas program is that the consent order is transferable to subsequent
purchasers of the property. 3
4. Michigan
Other states across the nation have established brownfields programs as well.
Michigan has taken a unique approach in this area. Instead of a typical voluntary
cleanup program, Michigan has changed its CERCLA-equivalent statute in an
attempt to solve the problems that it created." Before being amended, the
Michigan Environmental Response Act6" contained liability provisions almost
identical to those under CERCLA. 6
Amendments enacted in June 1995 added a causation requirement for property
owner liability and also provided cleanup liability protection for future pur-
chasers.67 Future purchasers are protected from liability only if they perform a
Baseline Environmental Assessment, which is an assessment of contamination
existing on the property at the time of purchase,' and submit a report to the
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality ("Michigan DEQ")."9 The
amendments also exempt lenders from liability, in certain circumstances, as an
incentive for them to finance the development of brownfields.7 °
Although the amendments eliminated liability for a person based solely on his
or her "status" as an owner or operator, they impose upon owners and operators a
duty not to exacerbate existing contamination, as well as a duty to exercise due
care in the use of the property.7' These duties ensure a balance between invest-
ment protection for the property owner and public health and safety.72
57. Id. §§ 8-7-1102 and 8-7-1104(a).
58. Id. §§ 8-7-1101(2) and 8-7-1104(a)(3).
59. Id. § 8-7-1104(d).
60. Id.
61. Id. §§ 8-7-1104(g), (h), (j)(1).
62. Id. § 8-7-1104(j).
63. Id. § 8-7-1104(o).
64. VOLZ & GRAY, supra note 2, at 250.
65. MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 324.20101-.20141 (Supp. 1996).
66. VOLZ & GRAY, supra note 2, at 249.
67. MICH. CoMp. LAWS §§ 324.20126(1)(a) and (c); see VoLz & GRAY, supra note 2, at 249.
68. Id. § 324.20101(d).
69. VOLZ & GRAY, supra note 2, at 249.
70. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 324.20126(4)(b); see VoLz & GRAY, supra note 2, at 249.
71. Id. §§ 324.20107(a)(1)(a)-(b).
72. See VoLz & GRAY, supra note 2, at 250.
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On July 10, 1996, Region V of the EPA entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with the Michigan DEQ.73 In that memorandum, the EPA "promised
not to 'plan or anticipate any federal action' under CERCLA against any party
covered by the Michigan Environmental Response Act, as long as the party was
in compliance with the Act.74 This is a significant added incentive to redevelop-
ment.
5. Ohio
Ohio's brownfields program is a voluntary program and "is one of the most
detailed and comprehensive" programs that has been enacted.7" The program
allows private voluntary cleanups, and when the party conducting the cleanup
proves that the property meets applicable standards, the Ohio EPA issues a
covenant not to sue.76 The voluntary cleanup begins with a phase I assessment of
the property, which includes investigation of past ownership of the property, past
use of the property and surrounding property, and a cursory inspection of the
property.77 If the phase I assessment shows that all applicable standards are, or
will be, met because (1) there is no reason to believe a release of hazardous sub-
stances has occurred, (2) any releases that have occurred do not exceed the stan-
dards, or (3) the planned remedial activity will meet the standards, the certified
professional conducting the assessment may issue a "no further action letter" to
the Ohio EPA.78 The Ohio EPA may then be petitioned for a covenant not to sue,
which it must grant if public health and the environment are protected.79 The
covenant is revocable if the standards cease to be met.8 The covenant runs with
the land.81
To ensure proper cleanups, the Ohio EPA is required to audit at least twenty-
five percent of all "no further action" letters.2 Among the incentives offered by
the program are flexible cleanup criteria based on the intended future use of
the property, such as industrial, instead of residential, uses, and lender liability
protection to encourage financing for brownfields purchases.83 The Ohio pro-
gram also provides low-interest cleanup loans through the Ohio Water Pollution
Loan Fund, the Ohio Pollution Prevention Loan Program, the Ohio Department of
Development, and the Ohio Water Development Authority.84 Finally, the Ohio
program provides for franchise and personal tax credits to persons involved in
the program.8"
73. DAvis AND MARGOLIS, supra note 32, at 468.
74. Id.
75. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.01-.99 (Banks-Baldwin 1998); see VOLZ & GRAY, supra note 2, at 250-
51.
76. Id. §§ 3746.10 and.12.
77. VOLZ & GRAY, supra note 2, at 251.
78. Id. at 251 (citing Omno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.10 and .11).
79. VOLZ & GRAY, supra note 2, at 251 (citing Orno REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3746.12(A), (C)).
80. OHIO REV CODE ANN. §§ 3746.12(B), (E).
81. Id. § 3746.14.
82. Id. § 3746.17.
83. Id. §§ 3746.04 and .26.
84. Id. §§ 6111.036, 6123.032, 6123.04, 6123.041; see DAvIS AND MARGOLIS, supra note 32, at 546.
85. DAVIS AND MARGOLIS, supra note 32, at 546 (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 122.19).
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6. Oregon
The Oregon legislature passed the Recycled Lands Act of 1995 to address the
brownfields problem.8 The program has three major provisions. First, the pro-
gram requires a prospective purchaser to perform a "probabilistic risk-based
assessment" of the site, taking into consideration numerous factors, including
risk of future human exposure, estimates of exposure levels, and current and
future land uses."' Once the risk assessment is performed, the prospective pur-
chaser may negotiate with the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
("Oregon DEQ") on remedy selection.' The program allows the Oregon DEQ to
approve any remedy, including "excavation, disposal, containment, . . . any other
engineering or institutional controls... [or] any combination of other methods,"
that will provide adequate protection to human health and the environment. 9
Therefore, a prospective developer is not limited to expensive remediation.
Finally, once a remedy is agreed upon, the Oregon DEQ may enter into an agree-
ment with the prospective developer or purchaser, in which the Oregon DEQ
agrees to provide a release of liability after the prospective developer completes
the agreed-upon remediation9
7. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania has three acts that combine to form the state's brownfields pro-
gram. First, the Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards
Act91 provides for setting risk-based remediation standards, sets a definite proce-
dure for the approval or denial of remediation plans, and provides liability pro-
tection, including releases from the state and protection from citizen suits and
contribution actions.92 Next, the Economic Development Agency, Fiduciary, and
Lender Environmental Liability Protection Act93 provides protection from state
and common law liability for lenders, fiduciaries, and economic development
agencies, provided they did not contribute to the contamination on the site.94
Finally, the Industrial Sites Environmental Assessment Act9" provides grant funds
of two million dollars per year for environmental site assessments in certain
communities.98 Other parts of the Pennsylvania program provide further funds
for grants and loans for voluntary cleanup.97
86. OR. RE. STAT. §§ 465.257, .315, .327 (1997).
87. See DAVIS AND MARGOLIS, supra note 32, at 559 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 465.315(2) (1995)).
88. DAVIS AND MARGOLIS, supra note 32, at 559.
89. See id. at 560 (citing OR. REV. STAT. §§ 465.315(1)(b), (c)).
90. See DAVIS AND MARGOLIS, supra note 32, at 560-61 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 465.327).
91. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6026.101-.908 (Supp. 1998).
92. DAVIS AND MARGOLIS, supra note 32, at 568.
93. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6027.1-.14 (Supp. 1998).
94. DAVIS AND MARGOLIS, supra note 32, at 568.
95. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6028.1-.5 (Supp. 1998).
96. DAVIS AND MARGOLIS, supra note 32, at 568.
97. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6026.701 and .702 (1995).
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IV AN OVERVIEW OF THE Mississippi BROWNFIELDS VOLUNTARY CLEANUP
AND REDEVELOPMENT ACT
On April 8, 1998, the Mississippi Legislature passed the Mississippi Brown-
fields Voluntary Cleanup and Redevelopment Act. 8 The purpose of the Act is
to "provide incentives for the voluntary cleanup of brownfields property (which
the legislature has determined exists in Mississippi) 9  without use of taxpayer
funds."
100
A. Sites Eligible for the Program
The Act defines "brownfields property" as property that is limited in use
because of contamination or potential contamination and is subject to remedia-
tion under any state environmental program or CERCLA. 101 The Act does not
cover sites that are on the National Priorities List, except those for which the
EPA has issued "certificates of completion of the remediation."'° 2 The Act also
excludes from the definition of brownfields those sites subject to an existing
administrative order, sites involved in an enforcement action under CERCLA or
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), and sites undergoing
corrective action under RCRA.0 3
B. How to Participate in the Program
A party wishing to participate in the program-a "brownfields party"--must
provide the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") with an
application.104 The application must demonstrate that the property will be put to
a suitable use after remediation and that the brownfields party has the financial
and technical resources to undertake and complete the remediation, o The party
submitting an application must pay a $2,000 fee. 10
If the application is approved, the DEQ will prepare a proposed brownfields
agreement.0 7 The agreement must contain a legal description of the property, a
description and schedule of remediation to be performed, the proposed uses of
the property, and any other requirements the department deems necessary for
completion of the agreement. 0 8 Remediation requirements are to be "based on
public health and environmental risks."10 9 In setting remediation requirements,
the department must also take into consideration the projected future use of the
property, any land-use restrictions on the property, engineering controls to be
98. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-35-1 to -27 (Supp. 1998).
99. However, as of December 1995, there were no brownfields sites identified in Mississippi. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE STUDY, Table V-21
(1995).
100. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-35-3(e) (Supp. 1998).
101. Id. § 49-35-5(d).
102. Id. § 49-35-5(d)(i).
103. Id. §§ 49-35-5(d)(ii) and (iii).
104. Id. § 49-35-7.
105. Id. §§ 49-35-7(1)(a)(i) and (ii).
106. Id. § 49-35-25(2).
107. Id. § 49-35-9.
108. Id. § 49-35-7.
109. Id. § 49-35-7(6).
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applied to the property, and cost effectiveness.110 The department must publish a
notice of the proposed agreement and allow public comment."11 The Commis-
sion on Environmental Quality ("Commission"), if satisfied that the agreement
complies with all applicable laws and regulations, will then approve the agree-
ment by order. 12
C. Benefits of Participating in the Program
Compliance with the brownfields agreement affords the brownfields party pro-
tection from liability for remediation and any costs reasonably related to such
remediation, except those costs required in the agreement. 13 However, the extent
of the liability protection is limited. Execution of a brownfields agreement
relieves a brownfields party from liability to all parties except the United States. " 4
Violation of the terms of the agreement and failure to correct the violation sub-
jects the brownfields party to removal of all liability protection and possible civil
penalties. " The protection from liability extends to the contractor performing
the remediation work, current and future owners of the property, future develop-
ers or occupants of the property, lenders financing the remediation, and any suc-
cessors or assigns of these parties.'
Curiously, however, the Act expressly states that, except for the liability protec-
tion listed above, the Act in no way affects a person's right to seek relief from any
party to the brownfields agreement who has any liability associated with the
brownfields site. 17 This language will likely require judicial interpretation and
could be interpreted in such a manner that thwarts the overall purpose of the
statute. 11
The Act also fails to provide any economic incentives to redevelopment of
brownfields. Although the Act establishes the "Brownfields Cleanup and
Redevelopment Trust Fund," 9 the fund is expressly intended to defer adminis-
trative costs of the program, not to provide any economic boost to redevelop-
ment. 20 The Act does not provide for loans, grants, or tax incentives of any kind.
The only economic incentive produced by the Act is the inherent benefit of lower
development costs due to a lower level of remediation than likely would be
required under CERCLA.
Once the agreement has been completed to the Commission's satisfaction, the
Executive Director of the DEQ issues a "no further action" letter."'2 The letter
110. Id.
111. Id. § 49-35-9.
112. Id. § 49-35-11(1).
113. Id. § 49-35-15(1).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 49-35-13(2).
116. Id. § 49-35-15(2).
117. Id. § 49-35-15(1).
118. See infra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
119. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-35-25(4) (Supp. 1998).
120. Id. § 49-35-25(4)(b).
121. Id. § 49-35-15(6).
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states that no further action is required "to assure that the remediation ... is pro-
tective of public health and the environment."' 22 No further remediation will be
required on the property unless: (1) the DEQ becomes aware that the brownfields
party provided false information about the extent of contamination that formed
the basis for the brownfields agreement or about the completion of the agree-
ment; (2) new information about the contamination, which requires further
action, becomes available after completion of the remediation; (3) the level of
risk to public health or the environment changes in such a way that requires fur-
ther action; or (4) proper notice of the brownfields agreement is not filed pur-
suant to Section 49-35-17 of the Mississippi Code. 123
D. Limitations on the Effect of the Act
Section 49-35-23 of the Mississippi Code states the limitations on the Act. The
Act does not affect the zoning power of local governments. 124 The Act also is not
intended to impinge on the Commission's enforcement powers regarding other
environmental laws. 2 ' The Act in no way prohibits immediate responses to
emergency situations by the DEQ. 12 Moreover, a brownfields party may not be
relieved from liability for contamination occurring after completion of the agree-
ment or for contamination exacerbated by conduct of the brownfields party. 127
Parties to the agreement retain their right to seek contribution from third parties.
' The Commission and the DEQ are not prohibited in any way from enforcing
federal directives required to retain delegation of federal programs or to receive
federal funding. 129 The Act is explicitly not intended to "[c]reate a defense
against the imposition of criminal and civil penalties or other administrative
enforcement remedies authorized by law and imposed... for the pollution of the
land, air, or waters of this state on or under a brownfield agreement site."13
Finally, the Act does not relieve any person of the duty to exercise "due dili-
gence" in performing environmental assessments. 3'
V SOME COMMENTS ON THE MississiPPi BROWNFIELDS ACT
The Mississippi Brownfields Voluntary Cleanup and Redevelopment Act is a
noble effort on the part of the Mississippi legislature, but is, at best, merely a
first step toward correcting a problem that will otherwise continue to grow. One
must ask, "what effect will it really have?" There seems to be ample room for
improvement in the Act.
122. Id.
123. Id. § 49-35-15(5).
124. Id. § 49-35-23(a).
125. Id. § 49-35-23(b).
126. Id. § 49-35-23(c).
127. Id. § 49-35-23(d).
128. Id. § 49-35-23(e).
129. Id. § 49-35-23(0.
130. Id. § 49-35-23(g).
131. Id. § 49-35-23(h).
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As discussed previously in this Comment, CERCLA and its state-level counter-
parts are the root of the brownfields problem. 32 The main weakness of the Act
is that Mississippi does not have a CERCLA-equivalent statute,133 although
Mississippi does have some environmental statutes, such as the Nonhazardous
Solid Waste Planning Act,134 the Mississippi Water Pollution Control Revolving
Fund and Emergency Loan Fund Act,135 the Mississippi Underground Storage Tank
Act,13 and the penalties section of the Mississippi pollution prevention statutes,
137
which serve some functions similar to CERCLA. The Pollution Emergency
Fund is the Mississippi statute with the closest resemblance to the Superfund
aspects of CERCLA. 138 That statute authorizes the Commission to use the fund
"for the purpose of mitigation, abatement, clean-up or other remedial actions"
related to the "introduction of ... hazardous wastes, upon or into the land ... of
this state .... [The fund] may be used for purposes of providing the required state
matching funds to assist the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in furtherance
of its remedial clean-up program."139 Conspicuously missing from all of these
statutes are liability provisions substantially similar to the ones that are the root of
the brownfields problem in other states.
The absence of a corresponding CERCLA-equivalent statute is a weakness of
the Act because, without liability provisions in other state statutes, the liability
protection afforded by the Act14 is, at best, limited. Since the Act provides pro-
tection from liability to "all persons other than the United States,"141 there is no
state law liability, but a prospective purchaser or developer of a brownfields site
in Mississippi is still potentially liable to the EPA under CERCLA. Therefore, it
is not clear that the liability protection under the Act actually provides much of
an incentive to prospective purchasers.
Additionally, vague language in §§ 49-35-15(1) and 49-35-23 could be inter-
preted in such a way as to defeat the stated purpose of protecting a brownfields
party from liability. Section 49-35-15(1) first states that a brownfields party is
protected from liability for remediation, and costs associated with it, to "all per-
sons other than the United States."143 However, the last sentence of that same
section says that any right to relief that a third party would have from a brown-
fields party, beyond remediation and costs, is not affected by the Act. 43 Section
49-35-23(g) then specifies that the provisions of the Act are not intended to
132. See supra Part II.
133. But see Miss CODE ANN. § 49-17-43(d) (Supp. 1998). That statute has language reminiscent of CER-
CLA, but it is part of the Mississippi Air and Water Pollution Control Law and applies only to owners or opera-
tors of facilities. Therefore, liability under the statute is not as extensive as under CERCLA.
134. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-201 to -235 (1995).
135. Id. §§ 49-17-81 to -89.
136. Id. §§ 49-17-401 to -433. The foregoing statutes are actually more akin to RCRA than to CERCLA,
especially the Underground Storage Tank Act.
137. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-17-43(d).
138. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 49-17-43(d) and 49-17-68 (Supp. 1998).
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.




MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
create a defense for the brownfields party to any enforcement action authorized
by other law. 1"' This could include third party actions under CERCLA. By
including these two provisions in the Act, the legislature indicates its awareness
that CERCLA pre-empts state law. Because CERCLA does, in fact, pre-empt
any state law, the state has no power to protect a brownfields party from liability
to the United States, or any other person, under CERCLA.
To summarize the problem, the Act does not protect a brownfields party from
liability to the United States under CERCLA, and since CERCLA pre-empts
state law, the state may not protect a brownfields party from third party actions
under certain provisions of CERCLA, such as citizen suits and contribution.
Therefore, if the Act purports to provide protection from third party actions, that
protection applies only to state law actions. As stated previously, Mississippi has
no CERCLA-equivalent statute imposing liability or providing for third party
actions. Therefore, the only liability protection practically afforded by the Act is
from DEQ enforcement actions. Whether this provides a significant incentive to
redevelopment remains to be seen. However, the fact that brownfields sites tend
to be too small to warrant EPA involvementI ' s may be a saving grace for the Act.
The Act's major weakness could be partially remedied by a Memorandum of
Agreement ("MOA") between the state and the EPA. Such an agreement, stating
that the EPA will not prosecute enforcement or cost recovery actions against a
party participating in the state brownfields program, coupled with the liability
provisions of the Act, would provide a significant incentive for prospective pur-
chasers. Although the lack of EPA guidance on drafting MOAs in situations in
which a state has a brownfields program is an obstacle to negotiating a MOA,148
a state would not seem to be precluded from negotiating such an agreement.
The Act has additional room for improvement. In particular, the lack of eco-
nomic incentives needs to be addressed. One suggestion is to incorporate some
sort of tax credits or waivers, as other states have, 147 for parties involved in
brownfields agreements.
One other interesting economic incentive that could be implemented is a low
interest loan or grant program. The Act, as written, established the Brownfields
Cleanup and Redevelopment Trust Fund. 148 As it stands, however, the fund is to
be used only to pay the costs of administration of the brownfields program.
While it is important to defer as many administrative costs as possible from the
general budget of an agency that has limited resources, it does not seem infeasi-
ble to use money from the fund, or to establish another fund, to provide financial
backing for the redevelopment of brownfields.
It must be noted that one of the stated purposes of the Act is to clean up and
redevelop brownfields "without use of taxpayer funds."149 However, sources of
144. Id. § 49-35-15.
145. Williams, supra note 3.
146. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., supra notes 53 and 86 and accompanying text.
148. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-35-25(4).
149. Id. § 49-35-3(e).
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funds similar to the sources used for funding the present brownfields trust fund
could be used to fund low interest loans without burdening the taxpayers of
Mississippi. Moreover, the program could be set up as a long-term one, that is,
allow the fund to build over time and gradually implement a loan program.
Similar loan programs have been successful in other situations. 1 0
There are, however, some insightful provisions in the Act. Basing cleanup cri-
teria on cost effectiveness and available technology in terms of engineering con-
trols, as well as risk-based factors,"'1 will likely lower the cost of remediation.
This is a good incentive for purchasers or developers who tend to be financially,
as opposed to environmentally, conscious. Similarly, the lender liability provided
by the Act5 2 potentially could have a significant effect on the ability of prospec-
tive purchasers and developers to finance the revitalization of brownfields sites.
The Mississippi legislature recognized the fact that the Act, as written, has lim-
itations. This is evidenced by the requirement in § 49-35-27 of the Act that the
DEQ survey the programs in other states and make recommendations to the leg-
islature for improvements to the program.153 Also, § 49-35-21 of the Act requires
the Commis-sion to "promulgate regulations necessary to implement this act by
January 1, 1999."154 Those provisions show good foresight by the legislature and
allow the weaknesses in the Act to be improved. Of course, the ultimate success
of the program remains to be seen, but the Act at least gives the Commission and
DEQ a starting point from which to operate.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1998 Mississippi legislature took a step toward the redevelopment and
revitalization of historically industrial sites and other potentially contaminated
sites in Mississippi. The Mississippi Brownfields Voluntary Cleanup and
Redevelopment Act is similar to many such programs established in other states,
but it pales in comparison to most of those programs.
The legislation demonstrates the desire to solve the brownfields problem in
Mississippi, but the Act has some shortcomings. However, those shortcomings
are better viewed as room for future improvement. By providing for the sugges-
tion and implementation of additional programs, the legislature has indicated its
understanding that the effort to cleanup brownfields in Mississippi will take time
and that this Act is only a step toward achieving the ultimate goal. That goal is to
clean up and redevelop contaminated sites which, in turn, could significantly
improve the health of the citizens of the state, improve the environment in which
they live, and improve the economy of the state by putting contaminated property
to productive use.
150. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 49-17-81 to -89. Those sections establish the Mississippi Water Pollution
Control Revolving Fund and Emergency Loan Fund which, in part, provides low interest loans to cities for con-
structing waste water treatment facilities.
151. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-35-7(6) (Supp. 1998).
152. See id. § 49-35-15(2)(e).
153. Id. § 49-35-27(2).
154. Id. § 49-35-21.
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